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Scientific knowledge about the process of embryonic development has
provoked new and challenging issues for moral debate. The possibility of
cultivating embryonic stem cells to alleviate neurological disorders, such
as Parkinson's disease, has raised to new heights the ethical question of
killing embryos for these purposes. In addition, proponents of abortion
have invoked the process of embryonic development to challenge the views
of those who contend that life is to be protected from the first moment of
existence.
In this essay, I argue that embryonic development and the notion of
personhood have been misused in order to justify utilitarian interventions
upon embryonic life as well as to deny immunity from abortion to
embryonic human life. I make this argument in reference to two different,
but related, discussions of early abortion. The first discussion is that of Dr.
Jean Porter in her essay on moral action, and the second is the stated
position of a biotechnology firm that asserts a "developmental theory of
personhood" in defense of early abortion to cultivate fetal stem cells.
Dr. Jean Porter has written an extremely insightful and thoughtful
book l that deserves careful attention by those engaged in health care ethics.
Her recovery of the contributions of Aquinas to contemporary moral
debates regarding the moral act is especially timely and compelling.
However, she introduces her own, in my view, problematic assessment of
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the morality of abortion in the context of her di scussion of the views of
Aquinas on the issue.2
Acknowledging that Aquinas subscribed to the biological information
of hi s time, she also endorses Joseph Donceel's view that the theory of
"delayed hominization" is not harmed by newer genetic information and
stands on its own merits. That is, the physical, emotional, and social
contexts encountered by nascent life in its developmental ody ssey are still
"morally relevant" circumstances. These developmental stages, according
to the theory, possess significant valence to withhold judgment that
"animation" or "ensoulment" (scholastic terminology for the presence of
unique human identity) has occurred at the first moment of conception. 3
Dr. Porter argues that the allied concepts of non-maleficence (the
cardinal principle of medical ethics, "first do no harm") and equality,
notions ingredient and central to the moral perspective of Aquinas (and,
thereby linking him to us moderns), do not constitute an outright
prohibition of abortion. The burdens of an unwanted pregnancy or the
plight of conjoined twins are among the conditions that can justify an early
abortion , in Dr. Porter's perspective. The onset of brain activity constitutes
an important benchmark for Dr. Porter and, to her credit, she is opposed to
later term abortions.
I find this argument "curious" because it implies that the criteria of
non-maleficence and equality are not fully applicable to embryonic/fetal
life. Earlier in the book, Dr. Porter assesses the Thomi stic tradition and
argues, persuasively, that euthanasia is not permissible because the notion
of equality, properly understood, entails obligations of respect that cannot
be set aside. In other words, modern understandings of equality as a
synonym for autonomy, fail to capture the den ser, more textured moral
commitments embedded in Aquinas 's understanding of equality. The
respect that is owed to human life cannot be surrendered or overridden even by
"consenting adults." I find this rationale compelling, and am perplexed and
even more "curious" that it is not extended to the abortion argument.
Dr. Porter, among many others who wei gh in on the side of early
abortion in some circumstances, is unduly impressed by biological
development as a fact in fetal life, and concludes that these stages are
somehow "morally relevant." It is unimpeachably clear that human life is
genetically human from its conception. Let's grant that increasing
complexification, the acquisition of ever more refined capacities including
brain activity, is built into the process of development. Nonetheless, why is
it that these stages are "morally" significant? Why should it be permissible
to extinguish a living human being simply because debatable individuating
characteristics have not yet appeared?
Each of these stages is genetically programmed to occur in the
appropriate sequence at the appropriate time. Because human life is
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ineluctably on a continuum of development, a continuum that will continue
to floUli sh unless interrupted by accident or deliberate, willful intervention,
why should particular stages of the continuum be privileged or, conversely,
disvalued? To answer my own question, it seems to me that the point of
these diverse assessments of deve lopmental stages is to provide a
justifiable rationale for killing. Additionally, I think that it is a failure of
moral imagination to see these stages as di screte moments of existence
rather than as organic aspects of existing human life.
In other venues the mischievous lure of "biological development"
takes on particular resonance in ethically questionable appropriations of
the philosophical notion of "personhood." Paradoxically, an appeal to a
certain construal of "personhood" has become a convenient device to
justify killing of embryos for stem cell research. In fact, at this writing the
Geron Corporation, a bio-tech firm in Menlo Park, CA, relies on its own
Ethics Advisory Board 's endorsement of a "developmental theory of
personhood" to support its embryonic research program. According to this
understanding, the embryo/fetus "earn s" the protectability and immunity
associated with personhood as it acquires greater deve lopmental
complexity. Adopting an explicitly "pluralistic" approach to the criteria of
personhood, the Geron Ethics Advisory Board contends that "the principle
of respect for human life entails different considerations and entails
different obligations at different developmental stages ."4
Excluded from this protectability, of course, is the embryo with its
valuable stem cells. I contend th at " personhood" offers no meaningful
protection from hann if it is understood "developmentally." If personhood
does not, at the very least, mean " immunity from hann at any stage of
development," then it is a dangerous philosophical abstraction that
jeopardizes nascent human life. An entire literature has emerged around
the question of the "personhood" of the early embryo. James McCartney 's
study is quite useful in summarizing much of the scientific and ethical
perspectives on thi s topic. 5 The phenomenon of twinning, segmentation,
the emergence of the "primitive streak," and other early embryonic
structures, among others, have contributed to divergent ethical assessments
about the applicability of the term "personhood" to embryonic life.
McCartney insightfully points out that the philosophical and religious
intuitions of Pope John Paul II lead the pope to a different conceptualization
about the meaning ofpersonhood. 6 Much of the discussion in this literature
about the moral status of the embryo is directed at the applicability of the
notion of personhood to embryonic life . My point in this essay is that the
more fundamental issue is not the applicability of the notion, but the
criteria that govern the conceptual understanding of personhood itself.
I do not think that the biological complexity of embryonic
development constitutes a warrant for the killing of embryonic/fetal life.
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Killing is the critical issue, and the mask of "personhood" should not
obscure this reality. The notion of personhood needs to be rescued from the
distortions imported into its meaning by the Geron Ethics Advisory Board
and those who subscribe to the "developmental theory of personhood." At
the very least, personhood requires the concrete embodiment of the values
of non-maleficence and equality that Dr. Porter has identified as central to
the moral vision of Aquinas. Otherwise, embryos are subjected to the kind
of harmful selectivity inherent in the "developmental theory of personhood"
embraced by the Geron Ethics Advisory Board.
Stanley Hauerwas offers a salutary caution against reliance on abstract
notions like "personhood" in his short but pointed essay, "Must a Patient be
a Person to be a Patient? Or, My Uncle Charlie is not Much of a Person, but
He is Still My Uncle Charlie."? The point of Hauerwas's deceptively
whimsical essay is that among the "givens" of human life are relationships
and moral connections to others that are not grounded in our personal
choices and desires. "Uncle Charlie," warts and all, may not demonstrate
the attributes desired in a nice "person" but he is, nonetheless, an
undeniable "fact on the ground" who has claims of family upon us, and to
whom we owe certain obligations, regardless of his unsavory "personhood."
Relying on a notion like "personhood" to determine who is to count as a
morally protectable subject is risky business if the criteria for "personhood"
are developed in isolation from the moral practices, attitudes and
commitments that are concretely enfleshed in the Christian story about the
meaning and purpose of our lives.
Alasdair Macintyre's observation that we inhabit a world of moral
"fragments" without a coherent and unifying moral center lies at the heart
of the intractable lack of moral consensus in our liberal, postenlightenment contemporary culture. 8 The notion of "personhood" is one
such fragment that has lost its ancestral philosophical and religious
moorings originally designed to name the unrepeatable dignity of each
human subject.
In Maclntrye's account of moral philosophy, our moral notions and
principles are not immune from the influence of historical and cultural
forces that shape the vision or "story" of the values by which we order our
lives. Our contemporary world, whether we characterize it as "modem" or
"post-modem," or even "post-Christian," prizes the values of technical
reason, autonomy, and efficiency as components of its "story" of moral
order. According to this ethical narrative, moral reason is largely
"instrumental," that is, a process of reflection and judgment that is
pragmatic, utilitarian and directed towards the achievement of the desired
outcomes and goals of human action. It is not surprising, then, that a notion
like "personhood" detached from its philosophical and religious tradition is
molded to achieve purposes not foreseen in its original architecture.
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Regrettably, the notion has now become a fortuitous tool for abortion
advocates and the biotechnology industry. In contemporary parlance,
"personhood" is not so much a description of intrinsic, inviolable worth as
it is a "something extra" ascribed to a member of the human species to
justify its existence. That "something extra" may be intelligence, brain
wave activity, mobility or a host of other " individuating" qualities that have
served as candidates to ground the ascription of maximum protectability
and immunity from hann. Personhood, in other words, is understood as an
"ascribed" status, whereby those who are powerful set the rules concerning
those who are to count as members of the human species.
For the unfortunate embryo selected for stem cell cultivation, the
"developmental theory of personhood" is a slim consolation for its
deprivation of life. Moreover, a public policy grounded in such an
understanding threatens the lives of all that are similarly vulnerable.
Consider the plight of the developmentally disabled, to cite but one
example. Does the embryo/fetus deserve to be included among those who
are entitled to non-maleficence and equality? I think these notions, prized
by Aquinas, are most certainly applicable to our "developing" human kin.
I have deep appreciation for Dr. Porter's astute assessment that the
analysis of the moral act is not "theory-driven," but rather a dialogical
process requiring analogical construal of significant elements. Conclusions
are not deduced with apodictic certainty. Moral notions are "open-ended",
but do have normativity deriving from a focal point of pertinent
considerations. Dr. Porter locates thi s "focal point" for Aquinas in the
allied notions, mentioned above, of non-maleficence and equality. Since it
is clear from the tradition that Aquinas did not endorse abortion in spite of
the Aristotelian biology he inherited, it appears to me that these notions of
non-maleficence and equality logically should be extended to embryonic/
fetal life.
I think that prudence is required to prevent the risk of unwarranted
harm to the embryo/fetus as well as to assure its equality as a member of
the human species. On thi s score, the Church in its 1974 Declaration on
Abortion strikes the right balance by deftly avoiding the philosophical
question of when "ensoulment" takes place.9 Relying on the principle that
" what will be human is still human," the Church places the burden of proof
on those who support early abortion. In my view, the supporters of early
abortion have not made their case. Developmental stages are interesting,
even compelling, but they do not constitute morally relevant factors to
justify killing a being that is unarguably human as it negotiates its
developmental history. I am not convinced that Dr. Porter's construal of
Aquinas 's commitment to non-maleficence and equality supports her
justification of early abortion. Moreover, I am equally unconvinced by the
pluralistic criteria for "personhood" endorsed by the Geron Ethics
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Advisory Board. Unless there is a moral "firewall" to protect our
embryonic cousins from the misuse of the process of biological
development and the related moral notion of "personhood," utilitarian
appropriations of their lives will tragically and sadly continue.
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